b. Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

23. From this way of understanding things an argument is made for the conclusion:

Since beatitude is by the in-flowing or circumincession of the beatific object in respect of the beatifiable subject, and since this in-flowing or circumincession is more in the essence than in the powers (for from the in-flowing into the essence there is a redounding or derivation into the powers, and not conversely, because derivation or redounding is from the prior to the posterior, not conversely, whether the order is one of being or of reason; for that is principally such by which something else is such, and not conversely) -     therefore etc     . The proposed conclusion thus follows.

24. Again, and it is as it were the same point: God, who is beatitude in its essence, is more principally possessed in his essence than in his powers; for he perfects essence in some way through essence, namely by in-flowing in the manner stated; but he only perfects the powers through operations terminating in the essence under the idea of the good and true. Now he perfects more principally what he perfects per se under his proper idea than what he perfects only terminatively under the idea of an attribute.

25. Again, grace is consummate glory; but grace is principally in the essence of the soul, and redounds, under the idea of habit and virtue, to the powers;     therefore etc     . [cf. Ord. II d.26 nn.11-23].

26. Again, distributive justice has regard to the worth of the receiver according to geometrical proportion, namely so that to the more worthy more good be distributed; but an intellectual nature is, in reality and in idea, more noble and more worthy than its power;     therefore etc     .

27. And this argument coincides with the first reason for this question [n.16]. But the addition is made that “perception of this perfection only belongs to the essence through the powers: through the intellect indeed in knowing the essence, through the will as tasting it, as Hugh says on the above cited chapter 7 [n.21], ‘Two there are: knowledge and love; knowledge illumines, love (as feeding) satisfies; in this does beatitude consist: to know and love the good’,” or it consists in knowledge and love of the good.

28. But as to the authorities of the philosophers for the opposite [nn.9-13], the response is made [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 13 q.12] that according to the intention of the philosophers “the beatitude of man or angel does not concern their essence but only their power, through the medium of its operation. And they said this because they did not see true beatitude, which true beatitude consists not only in act of will and intellect but principally in the object itself’ - and this by in-flowing or circumincession in the way stated [n.23].